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THE TROUBLE WITH GIG TALK: CHOICE
OF NARRATIVE AND THE WORKER
CLASSIFICATION FIGHTS
SHU-YI OEI*
I
INTRODUCTION
It is by now widely accepted that businesses such as Uber, Airbnb, Lyft,
TaskRabbit, Rover, and DogVacay represent a new sector and way of providing
goods and services. This group of firms has variously been referred to as the
sharing economy, gig economy, platform economy, 1099 economy, and peer-topeer economy. The term “sharing economy” has arguably been the dominant
term used to describe the new firms.1 However, as time has gone on, terms like
“gig economy,” “peer-to-peer economy,” and “platform economy” have also
gained traction and prominence, among academics as well as the press.2 While
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1. For example, a quick search of the New York Times archives since January 1, 2006 yields 245
references to the term “sharing economy,” 115 references to the term “gig economy,” three results for
the term “1099 economy” and five results for the term “platform economy.” Terminology searches, N.Y.
TIMES, https://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/ [https://perma.cc/PDL5-EGHZ] (Follow hyperlink;
then set date range from 01/01/2006 to 10/02/2017 (date author conducted searches) and search “sharing
economy,” “gig economy,” “1099 economy,” and “platform economy,” separately). A search in the Wall
Street Journal online archives for the last four years yielded 620 hits for “sharing economy” as opposed
to 159 hits for “gig economy,” three hits for “1099 economy,” and nine hits for “platform economy.”
Terminology searches, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/public/page/archive.html (Follow hyperlink; set
date range accordingly and search “sharing economy,” “gig economy,” “1099 economy,” and “platform
economy” separately). Searches conducted on October 9, 2017 of the SSRN platform yielded 287
references to “sharing economy” since 2009. In contrast, there were 61 references to “gig economy” with
the oldest relevant reference occurring in August 2015, 39 references to “platform economy” with the
oldest relevant reference occurring in August 2015, and 6 references to “1099 economy” with the oldest
occurring in February 2015. Terminology searches, SRRN, https://www.ssrn.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/P
K74-N8WQ] (Follow hyperlink; set date range accordingly and search “sharing economy,” “gig
economy,” “1099 economy,” and “platform economy” separately). See also Aaron Smith, Shared,
Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RES. CTR. (May 19, 2016), http://www.
pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-economy/ [https://perma.cc/67NT-8XSZ] (finding based on
Pew survey of 4,787 American adults that 27% of those surveyed have heard of the term “sharing
economy” while 73% have not, and 11% have heard of the term “gig economy” while 89% have not).
2. For academic uses, see, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016);
Kathleen D. Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894394 [https://perma.cc/AB2F-F8AW]; Aqib
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references to the sharing economy persist, the gig economy terminology has risen
in popularity at the same time that the sharing economy terminology has been
increasingly critiqued.3 This shift partially derives from an emerging sense that
“sharing economy” is an inaccurate name for a sector that is so obviously
commercial in nature and not about sharing, generosity, or altruism.4
Yet, it is not just the term “sharing economy” that is loaded with meaning.
The other alternatives hold meaning too. For example, “gig economy” signifies
individuals landing a one-off project and carries a freelance connotation.
“Platform economy” suggests that large firms like Uber are merely a facilitating
intermediary for transactions between individuals. Likewise, “peer-to-peer
economy” de-emphasizes the role played by the startups in bringing together
workers or service providers and clients. In some situations, these latter
terminologies have been used purposefully to convey these meanings.5
The fact that several of the terminologies used to describe these new
arrangements are meaningful and purposeful should not be totally surprising.
Academics are familiar with the power of language in shaping public opinions
about regulatory outcomes, including outcomes in the new economy.6 Moreover,
Aslam & Alpa Shah, Taxation and the Peer-to-Peer Economy (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/187, 2017);
Ruth B. Collier, V.B. Dubal & Christopher Carter, Labor Platforms and Gig Work: The Failure to
Regulate (IRLE, Working Paper No. 106-17, 2017). For popular press and policy uses, see, e.g., Zeninjor
Enwemekar, What the Booming Gig Economy Means for the Future of Work, WBUR (Nov. 2, 2017),
http://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2017/11/02/gig-economy
[https://perma.cc/R5SV-FJUX];
James
Manyika et al., Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the Gig Economy, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST.
(Oct. 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/independent-workchoice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/Y37F-P54X]; Alana Semeuls, Could at Tax Fix
the Gig Economy?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2017/11/gig-economy/544895/ [https://perma.cc/M23S-EZ7H].
3. For examples of critiques of the “sharing economy” terminology, see TOM SLEE, WHAT’S
YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY (2015); Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the “Sharing
Economy” Hype: Airbnb and Uber are Facilitating Rip-Offs, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation
[https://perma.cc/K47J-FYFP]; Adam Chandler, What Should the ‘Sharing Economy’ Really Be Called?,
THE ATLANTIC (May 27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/sharing-economyairbnb-uber-yada/484505/ [https://perma.cc/M4QS-M4AF]; Alex Hern, Why the Term “Sharing
Economy” Needs to Die, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/oct/05/why-the-term-sharing-economy-needs-to-die
[https://perma.cc/9578-77HE];
Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the ‘Sharing’ Economy Wrong, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-gets-the-sharing-economy-wrong-1432495921;
Sarah
O’Connor, The Gig Economy is Neither “Sharing” Nor “Collaborative,” FIN. TIMES (June 14, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/8273edfe-2c9f-11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95 [https://perma.cc/NPX4-BZNZ].
4. See supra note 3.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See, e.g., JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE (2018) (discussing competing narratives in
the sharing economy); Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organ Entrepreneurs, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (D. Gordon Smith & Christine Hurt eds., forthcoming)
(noting how “[t]he rhetoric of the so-called ‘Sharing Economy’ presents the entrepreneurial firm as a
facilitator of co-operative exchange between both peers and strangers.”); Frank Pasquale, Two
Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309, 311 (2016) (developing a
counternarrative to dominant narratives in the platform economy); Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the
Sharing Economy and its Implications for Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 197, 209 (2017)
(discussing the relationship between narrative and regulation; examining the choice of the term “sharing
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scholars have noted how the new businesses have purposefully attempted to
direct and change regulatory outcomes in advancing their business model.7 Yet,
it seems that terms like “gig economy” and “platform economy” have slipped
into popular discourse without much interrogation. Rather than accepting their
existence unquestioningly (or, worse, feeling a sense of relief that they are at least
more accurate than “sharing”), it is worth probing in detail how these terms have
come into common usage and how they have shaped perceptions of the new
sector and helped push laws and regulations in desired directions.
This essay argues that many of the newer terms for describing the sharing
economy—such as the “gig economy,” “1099 economy” or “platform
economy”—are at least as problematic as, and possibly even more so than, the
sharing economy misnomer. Such “gig talk”8 advances a specific story regarding
the relationship between the worker or service provider and the business.9 That
story is one of relative independence between the actions of those providing
goods and services and the businesses that make the underlying transactions
possible. This claimed independence has implications for legal areas as varied as
worker classification, taxation, public accommodation laws, product liability
laws, and other types of regulation.10 Moreover, and more importantly, this essay
also argues that terms like “gig economy” or “platform economy” are potentially
more effective than “sharing economy” in exploiting extant legal rules and
ambiguities to generate the legal and regulatory outcomes that these new
businesses desire. By contrast, the term “sharing economy” is so obviously a
departure from the commercial reality of the transactions that its power in
affecting policy at the margins is more limited.

economy;” identifying five frames used by firms operating in the new sector).
7. See supra note 6; see also Jordan Barry & Elizabeth Pollman, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90
S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (2017) (characterizing the new businesses as regulatory entrepreneurs and
documenting how the new businesses have used various tactics to attempt to change the law in their
favor); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Can Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH U. L. REV. 989, 1028–29, (2016)
(describing firm uses of first mover advantage to opportunistically take advantages of gaps and
ambiguities in the law).
8. This essay uses the terms “gig talk” or “gig and platform talk” as a shorthand way to refer to this
collective of new terms for the new economy.
9. This essay uses the generic terms “firm” and “business” to denote what others have called the
“platform” that enables these services to be provided. It also uses the term “the new sector” in place of
terms like “gig economy” or “sharing economy.” These descriptions are chosen in the interest of
neutrality.
10. See generally David Berke, Products Liability in the Sharing Economy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 603
(2016) (products liability); Nestor M. Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016) (examining municipal regulation of the new sector);
Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform
Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017) (law of public accommodations); Oei & Ring, supra note 7 (tax law
implications); Daniel Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future
of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2016); Brishen Rogers, Employment
Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479 (2016) (labor
law consequences); see also Stemler, supra note 6, at 113–26 (describing some of the desired legal and
regulatory outcomes that sharing economy firms hope to achieve through use of framing).
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The reason why gig talk has been more effective lies not in the objective
accuracy of the chosen description itself but in how the chosen description
interacts with existing legal rules and ambiguities: Existing laws and legal
ambiguities can help constrain chosen descriptive narratives about the new
economy, acting as a roadblock that limits the potency of the chosen
description.11 But laws and ambiguities can also be employed to reinforce the use
of the chosen narrative.12 This observation suggests that if a narrative can find
support in existing laws or legal ambiguities, it is likely to prove sticky and legally
potent, even if it is fundamentally contestable. By contrast, if existing laws or
legal structures serve to undermine and overwhelm a given narrative, then that
narrative may turn out to be more benign, even if it is outlandish or inaccurate
on its own terms.13 Thus, in evaluating narrative language, we should not focus
merely on the veracity of the description itself, but also on the interplay between
the description, the legal treatment being sought, and the capacity of existing laws
to encourage or resist the chosen description and the legal outcome it suggests.
In particular, we need to pay attention to the extent to which current laws or legal
ambiguities can be harnessed in support of the narrative and corresponding legal
treatment that is being advanced. Under this analytical approach, terms like
“sharing economy” may turn out to be hyperbolic, yet harmless, while terms like
“gig economy” may have a much more significant legal impact.
This essay argues that as the new businesses gained an economic foothold and
legitimacy, the “community of sharers” narrative lost potency, due in part to the
fact that many laws, including tax laws, have served to discredit or block that
narrative. Simultaneously, the benefits of advancing a gig or platform narrative
became clearer to the firms operating in the new sector. As a result, replacement
terms such as “platform” or “1099” or “gig” economy have risen in prominence
as alternatives.14 These latter terminologies have been increasingly used by
academics and the press (partially due to dissatisfaction with the “sharing

11. For example, the necessity of taxing market transactions from an early stage effectively limited
the effectiveness of the sharing narrative. See SHARING ECONOMY TAX CENTER, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/sharing-economy-tax-center [https://perma.cc/8X9N-KFS4]
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 1008–27 (showing how existing tax law
applies to sharing economy transactions).
12. For example, in the early days of the new sector, the arguably sluggish pace of action to regulate
the ride- or home-sharing sectors helped reinforce the “sharing” narrative by supporting the idea that
these services were non-commercial and distinct from the taxicab and hotel industries. See, e.g., Jack
Newsham, Uber, Lyft Save Big by Avoiding Regulations, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 25, 2014), https://www.
bostonglobe.com/business/2014/12/25/uber-lyft-save-big-avoiding-regulations/pQAMk1KMOavlyZhWi
4XIaJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/P9WQ-RR27]; David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk
When It Comes to Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/
companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-to-regulators.html [https://perma.cc/GGN7-6PYW].
13. It is of course possible that the values such narrative expresses are so repugnant that the
narrative is problematic for other reasons.
14. See supra note 2; see also Max Gulker, Let’s Stop Calling it the “Sharing Economy”, AM. INST.
ECON. RES. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.aier.org/blog/let%E2%80%99s-stop-calling-it-%E2%80%9C
sharing-economy%E2%80%9D [https://perma.cc/U2UY-WFAH].
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economy” terminology), as well as by the businesses themselves.15 But these
terms are not neutral. Instead, they tilt towards a certain set of legal and
regulatory outcomes (such as independent contractor classification for workers).
And because gig characterization is actually plausible under current law, these
terminologies may have actually been more effective than the sharing economy
terminology in shaping desired regulatory outcomes, due in part to the greater
propensity of existing laws and legal ambiguities to support the claimed gig
characterization. This essay therefore argues that scholars and policymakers
should be vigilant about the ways in which “gig talk” has been used to promote
and shape legal outcomes. The move away from “sharing economy” language
may on its face appear to be a win for accuracy, but the important regulatory and
deregulatory work being done by the “gig economy” set of terms should not be
discounted.
This essay proceeds as follows: Part II describes the “sharing” or
“collaborative consumption” narrative and how that narrative was initially
wielded to try and win regulatory wars, with some initial success that slowly
became more limited. This was due in part to the discrediting effects of various
laws and regulations, such as tax and insurance law and local regulations, which
acted as a plausibility constraint on the “sharing” description. Part III describes
the rise of gig talk, such as “1099 economy,” “gig economy,” “peer-to-peer
economy,” and “platform economy.” This essay argues that these competing
terms have significance for important legal and regulatory battles (for example,
fights over worker classification), and have often been deliberately wielded to
win such battles. It details how businesses have employed existing laws and legal
ambiguities to buttress the gig story and support their desired regulatory
treatment and the ways in which they have exploited their first mover advantage
in order to do so. As a result of the effective harnessing of laws and legal
ambiguities in support of gig characterization, gig talk has turned out to be an
effective framing device for advancing desired regulatory outcomes, both in the
worker classification area and elsewhere. Finally, Part IV surveys the road ahead,
analyzing potential challenges to gig and platform talk. Recent regulatory and
public relations challenges to Uber and other businesses in this sector, as well as
improving economic conditions and technological advances, may be wildcards
that could support the rise of competing narratives (including those regarding
work and worker protection) or could lead to the decline of gig talk’s significance.
15. See, e.g., Kirsty Major, Uber had this Coming – It was Never Just a “Tech Platform”,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/uber-ban-london-ride-hailing-appcompany-employees-taxi-drivers-customer-safety-women-protect-a7961231.html
[https://perma.cc/
V98C-6ETL] (“For a long time, Uber had attempted to sell itself as a neutral technology platform that
offered the software to link up the owner of a rusting car on the driveway with a person in need of a
ride.”); Sam Shead, Uber’s Main Argument for Why it Doesn’t Need to Give Driver’s Worker Benefits is
Flawed, Lawyer Claims, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/lawyer-fightingfor-uber-drivers-uber-cant-call-itself-an-agent-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/HT9T-2N4W] (“The Californian
transport company has always maintained that drivers who use its platform are independent contractors.
It frames itself as a technology platform, connecting riders and drivers and taking a fee in the process.”);
see also sources cited, supra note 2.
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This essay does not claim that construction of these narratives about the
nature of the sector and the transactions occurring in it is the only way in which
the new businesses have achieved success or gained footholds and social
acceptability.16 Obviously the way in which the new businesses talk about their
legal model interacts with the actual legal and business moves they make to
ensure that their preferred characterization of the sector sticks. Moreover, this
essay also does not claim that gig characterization is necessarily the normatively
wrong one. It is quite possible that courts and observers could reasonably
conclude that those working in this sector are accurately classified as independent
contractors based on assessment of all the facts. Instead, the essay has more
modest goals: First, to emphasize how, in marketing a sector of first impression
involving transactions that arguably fall into a regulatory gray area,17 descriptive
framings have been purposefully employed by some (and accidentally supported
by others) to advance legal and regulatory ends. Second, to show that in a gray
space in which legal rules and norms are still developing, it is not just the most
obviously wrong framings, but also the less obviously flawed ones, that we ought
to be concerned about. In some instances, the former may be more easily resisted
by current laws while the latter may be more purposefully deployed to advance
hidden regulatory and economic goals.
II
THE “SHARING” NARRATIVE
One of the origin narratives advanced about the new businesses was a story
of sharing or collaborative consumption.18 In its early stages, the new sector was
marketed by the businesses and their proponents as a trust and collaborationbased method of providing services between ordinary people who “shared” their
stuff on an “excess capacity” basis.19

16. For example, it is clear that the new businesses have engaged in not insignificant degrees of
lobbying in order to obtain their desired regulatory treatment. See, e.g., Catherine Ho, Airbnb Bulks Up
Lobbying Presence as Lawmakers Increase Scrutiny of “Sharing Economy,” WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/10/11/airbnb-bulks-up-lobbying-presenceas-lawmakers-increase-scrutiny-of-sharing-economy/?utm_term=.35c9b6f65888 [https://perma.cc/7MVE
-N8XZ]; Gerald B. Silverman, Uber, Airbnb, Tech Companies Spend Big Bucks Lobbying in N.Y.,
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/uber-airbnb-tech-n73014451621/
[https://perma.cc/4ZLC-7HC4].
17. See generally Oei & Ring, supra note 7 (discussing how new businesses have harnessed legal and
regulatory ambiguities).
18. See supra note 1; Stemler, supra note 6, at 109–12 (discussing choice to use the term “sharing
economy”).
19. Anya Kamenetz, Is Peers the Sharing Economy’s Future or Just a Great Silicon Valley PR Stunt,
FAST CO. (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.fastcompany.com/3022974/is-peers-the-sharing-economys-futureor-just-a-great-silicon-valley-pr-stunt [https://perma.cc/M3QZ-FGLF] (discussing the creation and
marketing of Peers.org by the new businesses as an organization “uniting the values of collaboration,
community, and entrepreneurship” and “building a bottom-up economy”; recounting how Airbnb sought
help of a for-profit consultancy that launches “social movements” and paid it to start Peers.org).
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A. The Sharing Story and its Early Gains
As others have noted, the sharing narrative highlighted the more gratuitous
aspects of transactions facilitated by online platforms and was advanced to
purposefully shape the regulatory treatment of the sector.20 It carried the
implication that these transactions belonged in the more personal, peer-to-peer
realm, and ought not to be regulated, governed, or taxed in the same manner as
similar transactions in a more commercial vein. For example, this narrative
conveys the idea that someone generously “sharing” their home by renting it out
on the odd day should not be subject to the same stringent health and safety
regulations as commercial businesses operating as hotels or should not be subject
to the same state and local taxes and fees imposed on hotels.21 Similarly, the
sharing narrative implied that someone helping out a neighbor with a home
improvement task in their spare time should not be subject to the same licensing
and insurance requirements as a general contractor in the construction business.22
Ridesharing services have embraced similar characterizations in arguing that
their drivers should not be subject to taxicab regulation.23
20. See Healy & Krawiec, supra note 6 (noting that “a striking feature of many of the most
prominent and allegedly disruptive services is their embrace of the imagery and logic of gift exchange
and reciprocity”); Stemler, supra note 6, at 205 (noting that “the term [sharing economy] invokes notions
of ‘helping others’ and ‘community’”); Donna Tam, Airbnb, Lyft Partner with New Share-Economy
Advocacy Group, CNET (July 31, 2013), https://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-lyft-partner-with-newshare-economy-advocacy-group/ [https://perma.cc/4DRT-W9R9] (noting how Airbnb, Lyft and
TaskRabbit have partnered with Peers.org, a nonprofit whose goal is “to promote and protect the
businesses and groups that allow people to share goods and services” for example by “holding events to
bring together advocates and users for ‘community-building’ and providing a place for them to share
stories and talk about related topics”).
21. Emily Badger, Airbnb is About to Start Collecting Hotel Taxes in More Major Cities, Including
Washington, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/
01/29/airbnb-is-about-to-start-collecting-hotel-taxes-in-more-major-cities-including-washington/?utm_
term=.4fe48e854573 [https://perma.cc/D9SR-J99W] (“In its younger — much younger — days, Airbnb
argued that hotel laws and taxes didn’t apply to a company that doesn’t run hotels.”); Rebecca Jarvis,
Hotel Industry Fighting Back against Airbnb, ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2014), http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/business/2014/04/hotel-industry-fighting-back-against-sites-like-airbnb/
[https://perma.cc/
F38L-2P3T] (countering New York Attorney General’s claim that many NYC Airbnb rentals are illegal
hotels and stating that Airbnb is “proud to stand up for our hosts who share their homes and against this
over-broad, government sponsored fishing expedition”); Donna Tam, NY Official: Airbnb Stay Illegal;
Host Fined $2,400, CNET (May 20, 2013), https://www.cnet.com/news/ny-official-airbnb-stay-illegalhost-fined-2400/ [https://perma.cc/4WPW-UGZL] (Airbnb statement to CNET that “Eighty-seven
percent of Airbnb hosts in New York list just a home they live in—they are average New Yorkers trying
to make ends meet, not illegal hotels that should be subject to the 2010 [short-term rental] law.”).
22. Colleen Taylor, TaskRabbit Raises $5M for Nationwide Expansion, GIGAOM (May 4, 2011),
https://gigaom.com/2011/05/04/taskrabbit-raises-5m-for-nationwide-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/7BVPXMMU] (quoting founder Leah Busque as saying “We’re really empowering people to sell their free
time and their special skills and services.”).
23. Sidecar, for example, a ridesharing service that eventually shut down, initially adopted suggested
donations for rides, rather than formal charges. Katie Fehrenbacher, Introducing SideCar, the Uber for
Personal Cars, GIGAOM (Jun. 26, 2012), https://gigaom.com/2012/06/26/sidecar-launches-with-real-timeride-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/B7K5-X95A]; Ariel Schwartz, The Potential for Pitfalls and Success in the
Sharing Economy, FAST CO. (June 26, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com/1680087/the-potential-forpitfalls-and-success-in-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/3T6E-DYGJ] (describing Sidecar’s
“Community Drivers” model). See also Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER, https://get.uber.
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The “community of sharers” narrative has also partially been able to gain
traction due to the existence of smaller and less formal platforms, as well as the
offering of various socially beneficial services as well as idiosyncratic services that
have gained popular traction. For example, platforms emerged offering sharing
of bathroom facilities24 and offering safe rides home to the LGBTIQQ
community and sex workers.25 Uber, a giant of the new economy, emphasized
the cuddly and communal nature of sharing by intermittently offering delivery of
kittens, Mardi Gras King Cakes, and ice cream.26 There has also been talk of how
to extend the sharing economy to facilitate social enterprise and non-profit
activities.27 Purposefully or not, these smaller-scale examples of how sharing
among peers could operate and be harnessed for sociable or charitable ends have
helped buttress the sharing characterization.
The “community of sharers” narrative has been successful to some extent.
This success was due, in part, to the regulatory strategies employed by some
firms. Scholars have noted that several of the firms in this sector simply began
operations, acting under the assumption that they were not subject to various
regulatory regimes or simply choosing their preferred tax treatment.28 For
example, when Airbnb first began operating, it disregarded local rules restricting
short-term rentals and left collection of local hotel taxes to the individual hosts.29
com/p/legacy-cl-base/ (last visited, Oct. 8, 2017) (“Get paid weekly just for helping our community of
riders get rides around town.”).
24. Suzy Strutner, Airpnp is the Best Way to Find Toilets in a Hurry, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan 25,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/25/toilet-finder-app_n_6518116.html [https://perma.cc/
5GPU-9CBQ].
25. See, e.g., Vanessa L. Pinto, Homobiles: Possibly the Best S.F. Ride Service Ever, SF WKLY. (June
21, 2012), https://archives.sfweekly.com/exhibitionist/2012/06/21/homobiles-possibly-the-best-sf-rideservice-ever [https://perma.cc/534C-EJ6E] (describing Homobiles as service “to provide safe rides home
to people vulnerable to harassment, such as sex workers or transgender folks”); HOMOBILES,
http://www.homobiles.org/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (California nonprofit organization “Committed to
providing secure and reliable transit to the SF Bay Area LGBTIQQ community and its allies.”).
26. King Cakes on Demand, UBER BLOG (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.uber.com/blog/new-orleans/
request-a-king-cake-on-demand-on-jan-6/; Meet the Purrr-sidential Candidates, UBER BLOG (Oct. 26,
2016), https://www.uber.com/blog/colorado/uber-kittens/; Uber Ice Cream is Here!, UBER NEWSROOM
(Aug. 20. 2017), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber-ice-cream2017/.
27. See, e.g., Erin Morgan Gore, Nonprofits Should Lead the Sharing Economy, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 3, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/nonprofits_should_lead_the_
sharing_economy [https://perma.cc/KN2T-DNH4] (discussing “nonprofit success stories” in the sharing
economy and discussing how nonprofits can “tap into the full potential of the sharing economy”).
28. Barry & Pollman, supra note 7, at 398–400; Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 994; Diane M. Ring,
Silos and First Movers in the Sharing Economy Debates, LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 2018)
(discussing first-mover advantage and its effects on regulation).
29. See, e.g., Elizabeth Harris, The Airbnb Economy in New York: Lucrative but Often Illegal, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/nyregion/the-airbnb-economy-in-new-yorklucrative-but-often-unlawful.html [https://perma.cc/U99C-JDEW] (describing how various Airbnb hosts
disregard short-term rental prohibitions in New York City); Owen Thomas, Airbnb Home Rentals Aren’t
Even Legal in Its Hometown of San Francisco, BUS. INSIDER (June 11, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.
com/airbnb-illegal-san-francisco-2012-6 [https://perma.cc/CA62-YRLA] (discussing how short-term
rentals violate San Francisco Admin. Code § 41A.5 prohibition of short term rentals); Brad Tuttle, The
Other Complication for Airbnb and the Sharing Economy: Taxes, TIME (June 15, 2013), http://business.
time.com/2013/06/15/the-other-complication-for-airbnb-and-the-sharing-economy-taxes/ [https://perma.
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Uber began operations in San Francisco and elsewhere with scant regard to local
taxicab regulations.30 These legal treatments may not have lasted, but the
businesses’ first-mover advantage served to delay the onset of potentially more
onerous legal and regulatory systems. Even after some states and localities were
able to force the platform into collecting local hotel taxes, these agreements
between Airbnb and localities did not always require collection of back taxes
owed for previous periods.31 With respect to ride hailing companies, it is
significant that these companies have not generally been required to compensate
taxicab medallion owners for declines in value of their medallions.32
B. Law and the Construction of a Commercial Counter-Narrative
Yet, the “community of sharers” narrative has ultimately not been powerful
enough to stave off regulation altogether. The commercial nature of the new
businesses quickly became apparent to regulators and legislators, as well as to
consumers and workers in the new economy. As the new firms grew in size,
transaction volume, and geographic reach, and as they sought to recruit more
participants, it became more and more difficult, if not outright
counterproductive, to characterize the transactions as gratuitous and not for
profit. Jurisdiction after jurisdiction has forced Airbnb and similar firms to enter
into agreements to collect and pay hotel taxes from guests.33 Jurisdictions have
started to impose restrictions on landlords’ ability to rent properties on Airbnb
(including local fees, direct regulations, and limits on number of days rented), as
the impact on local communities has become more apparent.34 Similarly, cities
cc/7DYQ-GTP9] (noting that “[a]ccording to Airbnb, it’s entirely up to the host to include the proper
taxes in their rental listing rates, and then it’s up to the host to pay them. ‘You are responsible for
managing your tax and other regulatory obligations,’ Airbnb’s Taxes FAQ section says. ‘Please contact
a tax professional or city compliance department for advice about your tax status and compliance.’”).
30. Brian X. Chen, A Feisty Start-Up is Met with Regulatory Snarl, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/technology/app-maker-uber-hits-regulatory-snarl.html
[https://perma.cc/3T69-2WJE] (quoting Uber CEO Travis Kalanick as saying “[I]f you put yourself in the
position to ask for something that is already legal, you’ll find you’ll never be able to roll out . . . . The
corruption of the taxi industries will make it so you will never get to market.”); Adrianne Jeffries, Uber
the Outlaw: A Rogue Startup Fights the Taxi Power, VERGE (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.theverge.com/
2012/9/7/3300244/uber-taxi-new-york-travis-kalanick-rogue
[https://perma.cc/6K7F-EU2Q]
(citing
former Uber general manager as saying “Their strategy has been ‘try and stop us, and if you try and stop
us, then we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it.”).
31. Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 1045–46 (discussing occupancy tax issues).
32. Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 81–
82 n.247–48 (2017) (discussing court cases where medallion owners have made taking claims and noting
general lack of success).
33. In What Areas is Occupancy Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Available?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653/in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-byairbnb-available?topic=264 [https://perma.cc/3MVX-4PWG] (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (listing
jurisdictions where Airbnb collects and remits local occupancy taxes); Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 1023–
27 (discussing growing number of jurisdictions where Airbnb collects and remits occupancy taxes).
34. See, e.g., Heather Kelly, Why Everyone is Cracking Down on Airbnb, CNN (June 23, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/22/technology/airbnb-regulations/index.html
[https://perma.cc/YMS92YAB] (discussing various local regulatory developments to crack down on Airbnb rentals); see also
What Regulations Apply to My City?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/961/what-
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and states have begun to impose fees on Uber rides and to enact ridesharing
legislation governing various aspects of ridesharing transactions.35 There has
been increasing pressure on platforms to curb discrimination (including racebased discrimination) occurring on their platforms.36
These developments were facilitated in part by lobbying efforts by
competitors and opponents of the new firms (for example, by the hotel and
taxicab industries), as well as by the press and academics drawing attention to
issues and problems raised by the new businesses.37 Under these influences,
legislators and regulators have become increasingly concerned about the
regulatory issues raised by the new businesses and the need to figure out how to
subject them to regulation consistent with their commercial nature.
More fundamentally, however, the sharing characterization was just not
plausible given the commercial underlying nature of the transactions, and such
implausibility became obvious once the new transactions came into contact with
existing law. The example of tax law is instructive. Despite the attempted
characterization of the businesses as “sharing,” the obligation for those
individuals operating in the new sector to file and pay taxes on income earned
from work quickly became obvious. In the very early days of the new economy,
some participants may have been unaware of their obligation to pay taxes.38
However, the notion that such income was not taxable was swiftly put to rest in
a number of ways: First, news articles began to discuss tax filing and payment
obligations.39 Second, the businesses themselves began including more
comprehensive information about tax obligations for sector participants on their

regulations-apply-to-my-city [https://perma.cc/CGX6-5YNN] (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (listing the types
of local regulations that might apply in various localities).
35. See, e.g., An Act Regulating Transportation Network Companies, ch. 187, 2016 Mass. Acts
(2016) (imposing new fee and various other regulatory requirements).
36. See, e.g., Tracy Jan, Faced with Complaints of Discrimination, Airbnb Partners with NCAAP to
Recruit Black Hosts, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2017/07/26/faced-with-complaints-of-discrimination-airbnb-partners-with-naacp-to-recruit-blackhosts/?utm_term=.ca2ec2a6c837 [https://perma.cc/THW5-QKHV]; Sam Levin, Airbnb Gives in to
Regulators’ Demand to Test for Racial Discrimination by Hosts, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/27/airbnb-government-housing-test-blackdiscrimination [https://perma.cc/QQ4R-2QYG].
37. See, e.g., Leong & Belzer, supra note 10; Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the
Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper 16-069, 2016),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-069_5c3b2b36-d9f8-4b38-9639-2175aaf9ebc9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM3W-S69F]; Mason Ameri et al., No Room at the Inn? Disability Access in the New
Sharing Economy (May 2017) (unpublished study), https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/
documents/PressReleases/disability_access_in_sharing_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/63WH-KCQQ].
38. See Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 993; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers:
Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56, 60 (2017) (noting, based on review
of postings by rideshare drivers on internet discussion forums, that forum participants’ understandings
of expenses and deductions “were less accurate and more varied in sophistication” than their
understandings of basic tax filing and income inclusion obligations); Tuttle, supra note 29.
39. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, If You Make Money in the Sharing Economy, the IRS Will Know,
SFGATE (Feb. 22, 2014), https://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/If-you-make-money-in-thesharing-economy-the-IRS-5258941.php; Tuttle, supra note 29.
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websites.40 Third, online forums, platforms, and services emerged that counseled
sector participants on the key issues at stake in preparing their taxes.41 Finally,
while some of the new businesses initially took advantage of legal ambiguity in
the tax law and did not report worker earnings at or below a certain threshold—
quite high at 200 transactions/$20,000 earned—to the IRS, others did eventually
begin to more comprehensively report income earned by workers to the IRS,
perhaps due to fear of penalties for information reporting failures.42
At this point, virtually all businesses in the sector are complying with tax
information reporting requirements, albeit by embracing the most plausibly
advantageous tax position.43 Thus, almost from the outset, multiple voices
reinforced to sector participants that tax filing and payment were not optional.
This message undermined the notion that participation in the sector was
gratuitous and non-commercial. While there may be some gray areas in terms of
where to report the income on the tax return and which expenses are deductible,44
the fact that income earned through platform work is taxable is quite well
understood at this point.45 In short, despite claims and characterizations about
“sharing,” it became difficult to assert that the new transactions were less
commercial than the old when income earned from work in this sector was clearly
taxable in a manner comparable to other commercial or work transactions.
Similarly, the gratuitous, sharing characterization was undercut by quickly
emerging insurance and other considerations. Many early participants may not
have fully thought through considerations of insurance coverage, including
whether their existing home, car, or personal liability insurance covered their

40. See, e.g., How Do Taxes Work for Hosts?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/481/how-do-taxes-work-for-hosts [https://perma.cc/3RG6-TL3Z] (last visited Oct. 7, 2017)
(linking to various related FAQ articles explaining tax obligations for hosts); Taxes 101 for Etsy Sellers,
ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/seller-handbook/article/taxes-101-for-etsy-sellers/22721885775 [https://
perma.cc/WC3X-C23U] (last visited Jan. 25, 2018); The Uber Partner’s Tax Guide: Everything You Need
to Know, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/resources/tax-tips-for-drivers/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
41. Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 1055–56 (describing some of these services); Oei & Ring, supra note
38, at 103–05 (same).
42. I.R.C. § 6050W(e) (requiring reporting by third-party settlement organizations only if amounts
are over $20,000 and there are more than 200 transactions) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050W-1 (2012); Oei &
Ring, supra note 7, at 1034–35; Oei & Ring, supra note 38, at 65; see also CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD
TAX POLICY CENTER, SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS
OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY (2016), https://www.american.edu/
kogod/research/upload/shortchanged.pdf [https://perma.cc/35KH-6G52]; Thomas, supra note 2. For
example, Lyft issues Forms 1099-K to drivers who receive at least $600 in gross ride receipts. See Tax
Information for U.S. Drivers, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115012926967-Taxinformation
-for-US-drivers [https://perma.cc/UC2D-5YCW] (last visited Apr. 23, 2018). In early 2015, Uber
announced it would issue Form 1099-K to all drivers regardless of thresholds, but later changed its
position and now only issues Form 1099-K to drivers who meet the $20,000/200 ride threshold. See Your
Tax Questions, Answered, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/tax-information/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2018).
43. See supra note 40.
44. Oei & Ring, supra note 7 at 993, 1009–10, 1014–15; Oei & Ring, supra note 38 at 60, 78.
45. See I.R.C. § 61 (2012) (broadly defining “gross income” as “all income from whatever source
derived”); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 38 at 77–78.
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activities in the emerging sector.46 However, early horror stories of drivers getting
into car accidents or insurance companies denying coverage for ride-hailing
activities or home-sharing activities, or of regulators and landlords imposing fines
or sanctions, quickly brought into focus the commercial nature of the
transactions, and undercut claims that they were merely personal or gratuitous.47
Additionally, some new sector participants soon learned that they had run afoul
of local zoning or occupancy laws or landlord-tenant leases.48 These early
encounters helped counteract claims that the activities in which they were
engaged were merely “sharing.”
This essay does not claim that there were zero benefits to the new sector of
embracing an excess capacity or sharing characterization at the initial stage.
These narratives clearly give the sector a first-mover advantage and may have
helped them get off the ground in the face of regulatory constraints. For example,
the sharing or excess capacity story may have served as a baseline negotiation
point, which prevented far more draconian regulation of the sector (for example,
classification of workers as employees, or requiring taxicab medallions).
The point, rather, is this: It is the very fact that “sharing” is such an extreme
characterization that compromises its longevity, and ultimately its vitality, as a
plausibly accurate description of the sector. Meanwhile, as argued below in Part
III, seemingly more accurate or balanced characterizations such as “platform” or
“gig” economy have quietly exerted a deep and significant influence on law and
regulatory outcomes. Because they are less obviously inaccurate and may capture
some aspects of work in this sector, these latter terms may have drawn fewer
challenges.
III
THE EMERGENCE OF GIG AND PLATFORM TALK
As the new sector has matured, the “sharing” terminology has been
increasingly critiqued.49 At the same time, a different set of descriptors has risen
to accompany and sometimes replace the sharing narrative. This cluster of
entrepreneurship-focused terms includes the terms “gig economy,” “1099
economy,” “peer-to-peer economy,” and “platform economy.”50 It is not entirely
46. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Share a Car, Risk Your Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/your-money/auto-insurance/enthusiastic-about-car-sharing-yourinsurer-isnt.html [https://perma.cc/Y4CT-2WXL].
47. Id.; see also Complaint for Damages and Demand for Trial by Jury at 4–5, Liu v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014) (wrongful death complaint for pedestrian killed by Uber
driver); see also Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for-airbnb-hosts-who-may-be-breaking-thelaw.html?mcubz=1/ [https://perma.cc/8EJ9-JDBM].
48. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 47.
49. See supra note 3.
50. See, e.g., Om Malik, Are You Ready for the New Peer-to-Peer Economy, GIGAOM (Mar. 11,
2011),
https://gigaom.com/2011/03/11/are-you-ready-for-the-new-peer-to-peer-economy/
[https://
perma.cc/BUZ9-AZBM]; David Streitfeld, Rough Patch for Uber Service’s Challenge to Taxis, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/technology/rough-patch-for-uber-services-
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clear what led to the emergence of this latter cluster of terms. As noted, the shift
to these terms stems partially from an emerging sense that the term “sharing
economy” is not accurate given the sector’s commercial nature.51 As a result,
commentators and journalists began to suggest the latter terms as replacements
that more clearly reflect the commercial nature of the sector.52 Academic articles
also began to emerge that eschewed “sharing” characterization in favor of
references to “gigs” and “platforms.”53
Meanwhile, firms in the sector—which were coming under increasing
regulatory pressure and scrutiny—also began to appreciate the legal advantages
of characterizing themselves as platforms and the work done by the workers as
“gigs.” The firms therefore began describing themselves using that terminology
as well.54 As described below, characterization of the work or services done in
this sector as a “gig” and the relationship between worker and firm as one using
a “platform,” lines up squarely with some of the important legal positions firms
in this sector wish to take. Many of these terms focus on the individualistic,
entrepreneurial character of work and services offered on the platforms and
serve to deemphasize the substantive role of the businesses themselves in making
the sector function. They enable the businesses to be conceptualized as mere
technology platforms that allow individual micro-entrepreneurs to connect with
other individuals and engage in commerce. All this, of course, undercuts the
sharing narrative of altruism and non-commercialism. However, the appeal of the
gig narrative is that it buttresses the substantive and high-stakes positions that
businesses like Uber and Lyft have taken with respect to worker classification
and other laws and regulations.
In the remainder of this Part, this essay largely focuses on worker
classification questions, first describing the essence of the worker classification
debate and then explaining how gig talk advances the positions taken by the
businesses in winning the debate. But it should be noted that the worker
classification question is inextricably linked to the broader business model
claimed by the new firms. Thus, this essay’s insights are also applicable to other
regulatory areas, such as tort liability, local regulations, and public
accommodation laws.55
A. The Worker Classification Debate and the Claimed Business Model
As the sharing economy businesses have matured, a persistent question that
challenge-to-taxis.html?ref=davidstreitfeld [https://perma.cc/S4NQ-MQXN]; David Streitfeld, Some
Setbacks for the Sharing Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/04/23/some-setbacks-for-the-sharing-economy/
[https://perma.cc/E26X-CKP4]
(Airbnb
spokesperson characterizing Airbnb as a “platform” in distancing itself from “predatory landlords”); see
also sources cited, supra note 15.
51. See supra note 3.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 2.
54. See infra Part III.B.
55. See supra note 10 and infra notes 89 and 91.
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has emerged has been how those offering services or accommodations via the
new firms should be classified in terms of labor, tax, and other laws.56 Specifically,
the issue is whether such workers are more appropriately classified as
independent contractors or as employees.57 The appropriate classification of
workers is one of the key contested questions in the ongoing tussle over what is
the correct description of the new firms’ business model. Are these firms app
providers that provide a platform to connect micro-entrepreneurs with a
customer base and whose own direct customers are these microentrepreneur/service providers? Or are the firms basically taxicab and food
delivery companies operating under another label, which hire workers to do the
work and whose customers are the ultimate service recipients? The answer has
important legal and regulatory implications.
1. The Worker Classification Question
The worker classification question is important for a number of areas of law.
Perhaps most importantly, for labor law purposes, classification as an employee
carries the right to bargain collectively under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), while independent contractors are not afforded NLRA protections.58
Employee classification also provides a worker with protections and advantages
under a variety of federal and state laws, such as overtime pay, minimum wage
laws, child labor laws, family and medical leave, and health and safety
regulations.59 Employees also enjoy more robust anti-discrimination protections
and old age retirement, disability, and medical benefits than independent
contractors.60
Direct protections and regulations aside, the classification of a worker also
matters for tax purposes.61 While employers must issue Forms W-2 and perform
wage withholding on compensation paid to employees, independent contractors
instead receive Forms 1099-MISC or 1099-K from payors, who do not withhold
56. For examples of academic literature addressing the worker classification issue, see Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 1763 (2016); V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur, Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 101 (2017); Benjamin Means & Joseph Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016); Rogers, supra note 10.
57. See supra note 56.
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (defining “employee”; excluding “independent contractors”).
59. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012) (defining “employee” by cross-reference to 29 U.S.C. § 203
(2012)); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012); CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (2017)
(prohibiting employers taking tips from employees); CAL. LAB. CODE § 226 (2017) (employer obligation
to provide itemized statements to employees); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (2017) (obligation to reimburse
employee mileage costs).
60. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2012) (defining “employee” under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2012) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 prohibiting discrimination against employees on the basis of sex,
race, color, national origin, and religion; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),(f) defining “employer” and “employee”);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
61. See Federal Insurance Contribution Act of 1935, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012); Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3311 (2012).
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taxes from payments but instead simply report payment amounts to the IRS.62
Such Form 1099 recipients are in effect regarded as small business owners for tax
purposes. As small business owners, they are eligible for more generous expense
deductions provisions than employees; they may deduct business expenses
“above the line” like other businesses owners, which means that such expenses
may be deducted in computing adjusted gross income and are not capped.63
Workers classified as independent contractors for tax purposes are nominally
responsible for paying the entire liability for social security taxes.64 In contrast,
employee social security taxes (Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes) are divided between employer
and employee.65 Independent contractors may also have to pay estimated taxes
on a quarterly basis, and may face penalties if they fail to do so.66 In short, for tax
purposes there are some benefits to being classified as an independent contractor
(more generous deductions) but there are also risks (such as risks of estimated
tax penalties).
Each legal area makes its own determination of appropriate classification and
may apply slightly different legal tests in doing so. For example, the common law
of agency test—derived from common law respondeat superior claims but now
contained in the Restatement (Third) of Agency—focuses on employer control
over the employee. This test has been applied for purposes of determining
collective bargaining protections under the NLRA.67 Another related test looks
at the economic realities surrounding the employment relationship—whether the
work done is an integral part of the employer’s business, whether worker’s
managerial skill affects her opportunity for profit, the relative investments of
worker and manager, the nature and degree of the employer’s control, and other
factors.68 This “economic realities test” has been applied by the Department of
62. See I.R.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3501, 6041, 6050W; see also IRS, PUBLICATION 15, at 20–24 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7PM-Z9FV]
(describing
employer
withholding obligations on employee wages).
63. Expenses are treated as expenses of a business and can therefore be deducted “above the line.”
See I.R.C. § 162 (2012); I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (2012) (deductions attributable to trade or business other than
performance of services as employee are above the line deductions). By contrast, unreimbursed
employee expenses are below the line deductions and may only be deducted to the extent that they
exceed 2% of adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 67 (2012). Moreover, such unreimbursed employee
expense deductions have been suspended for taxable years 2018 through 2025 as a result of new tax
legislation passed at the end of 2017. I.R.C. § 67(g) (2018).
64. See supra note 61.
65. See supra note 61.
66. I.R.C. § 6654 (2012).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (applying common law “right to control” test to ERISA
claims); Alexander v. Fedex, 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014) (class action by Fedex drivers for unpaid wages
and expenses under California Labor Code; court applied California control test; found that control and
other factors supported finding that drivers were employees); cf. Fedex v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (applying “significant entrepreneurial opportunity” analysis).
68. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #13: AM I AN EMPLOYEE? EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2014), https://www.dol.gov/whd/
regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW53-YF7P].
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Labor in applying the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.69 Yet another
test is the so-called “ABC Test,” which looks at freedom from control or
direction, whether the work done is outside the course of the company’s business
and off the business premises, and whether the worker is customarily engaged in
an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business. The ABC test is
applied by a majority of states in state unemployment insurance law analysis.70
Finally, the IRS applies a twenty-factor test in determining whether a worker is
an independent contractor or employee for tax purposes.71 The twenty factors
focus on behavioral controls, financial aspects of the job, and the nature of the
relationship between worker and hirer.
The determination of worker classification is done separately for each area of
law. However, there is overlap in the substantive considerations that each field
takes into account, although there may be differences at the margin.72 Moreover,
if a worker is classified as an independent contractor for one purpose (for
example, collective bargaining), such classification has the potential to influence
determinations in other areas of law by creating a presumption of correctness or
by harnessing a preference for consistency across legal areas. To be sure, different
fields employ different worker classification tests, but at least to some degree the
tests all examine the nature of the relationship between the business and the
worker, and they all pay attention to the control exercised by the business over
the worker.
There is currently a good deal of disagreement regarding not only the correct
classification of workers but also the normatively desirable one. In particular,
while workers classified as employees receive more robust direct protections as a
matter of labor and other laws, there may be some advantages to independent
contractor classification from a tax point of view, such as the ability to take more
generous business deductions.73 Furthermore, some argue that classifying sector
participants as employees will cause opportunities and profitability in the sector
to decrease.74 It is therefore far from obvious that all those who offer services in
the Uber economy prefer one classification over the other.75 Anecdotal evidence
69. Id.; see also United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (concerning employee status under Social
Security Act; Court sets forth five factors constituting economic realities test).
70. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449 (N.J. 2015) (holding that ABC test applies for
determining employee vs. independent contractor statute for New Jersey wage-payment and wage-andhour claims purposes).
71. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296; Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, IRS
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employedor-employee [https://perma.cc/KHB7-QTL2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
72. For example, the ABC test’s emphasis on whether the worker is operating an independent
business differs from the common law of agency “control” analysis.
73. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74. Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here’s What It Would Cost Uber to Pay its Drivers as Employees,
FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/17/ubernomics/ [https://perma.cc/XQ4X-YTQM]
(noting possibility of pay cuts and even “extinction” if Uber drivers were reclassified as employees); see
also Oei & Ring, supra note 38 at 93–94.
75. V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification
Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739; Oei & Ring, supra note 38 at 87–88,
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from news interviews and internet discussions among Uber drivers, for example,
reveals heterogeneity in preferences as between classifications.76
2. Relationship between Worker Classification and the Claimed Business
Model
Still, there is no question that stakeholders on both sides believe that
classification matters substantively. Several high-profile cases contesting the
classification of workers as independent contractors have been litigated against
Uber and other firms on behalf of drivers and other sector participants, and the
firms have vigorously defended themselves against such lawsuits.77 From the
point of view of the businesses, classification matters because the costs to the
businesses of employee classification are likely to outstrip the costs of having
independent contractors and may upend the business model.78 Classification of
workers as independent contractors may also be beneficial to the firms for
behavioral reasons—independent contractors who are not subject to tax
withholding receive larger payment amounts upfront, while employees receive
wage payments that have already been subject to tax withholding and are hence
less than gross.79 This may generate an incentive effect: workers may be more
willing to provide services on the new platforms if the taxes owed on their
earnings are less salient at the time they make the labor supply decision.80

93–94.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 930, 932–933 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Mohamed v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., 109 F. Supp.3d 1185, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 836 F.3d 1102
(9th Cir. 2016), superseded by 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016); Yucesoy v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 109 F.
Supp. 3d 1259, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013
WL 6354534, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013); Lavitman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. SUCV201204490,
2015 WL 728187 at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015).
78. See, e.g., J.B. Wogan, Employee of Independent Contractor? It’s the Uber-Important Question of
Today’s Economy, Government Technology, GOV’T TECH. (June 3, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/
policy/Employee-or-Independent-Contractor-Its-the-Uber-Important-Question-of-TodaysEconomy.html [https://perma.cc/7PUS-87CC] (noting that “[i]f all those [Uber] drivers had to be treated
as employees, the aggregate costs might threaten its very business model.”); see also Jack Denton, Two
Federal Lawsuits Could Spell Big Trouble for Uber, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 10, 2017), https://psmag.com/
news/two-federal-lawsuits-could-spell-big-trouble-for-uber [https://perma.cc/7C79-P8MN]. Independent
contractor classification allows more flexibility in hiring and firing, less obligation to permit workers to
collectively bargain for higher compensation, less obligation to provide retirement and other benefits,
and less direct liability for paying over social security taxes or performing tax withholding on employee
wages. Id.
79. See supra note 62.
80. See Gamage & Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience,
65 TAX L. REV. 19, 57 (2011) (discussing how, if the imposition of the tax is separate from the time of the
market (e.g., labor supply) decision, taxpayers may underestimate the tax burden); Gamage et al.,
Experimental Evidence of Tax Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or
Complexity?, 41 PUB. FIN. REV. 203, 214 (2012) (finding that “[s]ubjects are most willing to work when
their net wage is transparent. Any additional complexity in the wage description . . . decreases work
participation”); Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 COLUM. J.
TAX L. 218, 253 (2010) (noting that workers may be misled by gross salaries and may oversupply labor).
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More broadly, independent contractor classification also matters because it is
consistent with the overarching business model claimed by the new firms for legal
and regulatory purposes. The broader claim is that these firms are apps that
connect micro-entrepreneurial service providers with a customer base. Under
this conceptual vision, the customers of firms like Uber are the drivers, taskers,
or other service providers operating using the apps or websites, rather than the
end-user customers who enjoy the services. This claimed business model is
important for avoiding a broad range of regulations, not just employee
classification. For example, it allows the new firms to take the position that they
are simply technology companies—rather than taxi companies or hotels—and are
hence not subject to laws and regulations that have traditionally governed these
sectors.
Another example comes from securities laws and financial accounting: Uber
recently claimed that the Securities and Exchange Commission has assented to
Uber’s reporting of only net rather than gross revenues in its financial reporting,
without needing to report the amount being paid to drivers.81 Uber’s claimed
financial reporting position results from its adoption of new accounting “revenue
recognition” rules issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
that distinguish principals from agents for revenue reporting purposes.82 As
reported in the press, Uber views itself as an “agent” connecting the “merchant”
(driver) and the “customer” for financial accounting purposes that thus is entitled
to report only net revenues, even though some experts think gross revenues
would more accurately inform investors.83 The claim for financial accounting
purposes that Uber is an agent is purposefully consistent with the broader
business model advanced by the new firms that envisions the firms merely as
technology app providers rather than principal providers of services. However, if
courts and other tribunals call into question the firms’ (including Uber’s)
classification of their workers, then this financial reporting position may be called

81. Francine McKenna et al., Uber Believes it Has SEC Nod for Earnings Approach that Mirrors
Business Model, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/uber-an-earlyadopter-of-new-revenue-recognition-rules-believes-it-has-secs-blessing-of-its-business-model-2017-1025 [https://perma.cc/D2S8-9CTA].
82. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE
NO. 2016-08 (MAR. 2016), REVENUE FROM CONTRACTS WITH CUSTOMERS (TOPIC 606), PRINCIPAL
VERSUS AGENT CONSIDERATIONS, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?
cid=1176167987739&acceptedDisclaimer=true [https://perma.cc/K2VJ-HWU2]; see also Leslie Hook &
Richard Waters, Uber, Amazon and Microsoft Braced for Accounting Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES (July 19,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/74447ca2-6b0b-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa [https://perma.cc/X5GUX8M8]; McKenna et al., supra note 81.
83. McKenna et al., supra note 81 (describing Uber’s position; also noting that “[t]he determination
that Uber is the agent in its ride-sharing transactions is consistent with the company’s messaging
regarding its business model, which rests heavily on the premise that Uber drivers are correctly classified
as independent contractors, not employees” and that “a legal ruling that forced the company to reclassify
drivers as employees would significantly disrupt the company’s business model . . .[and] [i]ts revenue and
cost-of-sales accounting likely would have to change as well, since drivers’ portion of the revenue and
their salaries would be on Uber’s books”).
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into question as well.84
Thus, to a non-trivial extent, the desired worker classification being pursued
is inextricably related to the broader question of how the relationships between
service providers and customers and between firms and service providers are
characterized. To the extent the firms are simply regarded as a convenient app
with no substantive control over the service providers, the service providers may
be regarded as business entrepreneurs operating independently from the firms.
But if service providers are construed as under the control of the firms, this may
point towards more legal liability and accountability of the firms for worker
classification and other purposes.
B. How Gig Talk Pushes Legal Outcomes and How Law Abets Gig Talk
Against this factual backdrop, it becomes clear why gig talk has been
advanced as a competing narrative to “sharing” and why it has been effective.
1. The Use of Gig and Platform Talk to Frame the Debates
Gig and platform talk is useful in framing the activities of operators in the
new economy as peer-based and disassociated from the control and responsibility
of the firms themselves. These and related narratives highlight the peer-to-peer
nature of these transactions, put the service providers and customers at the center
of the transactions, and make the corporate firms appear less culpable, relevant,
or involved. If the work is “just a gig” and the firm “just a platform,” this suggests
a casual and possibly intermittent relationship between the service provider and
the firm.
In recent years, new firms have adjusted and managed the ways in which they
publicly describe work done via their web platforms to reflect the independentcontractor, peer-to-peer nature of the work. For example, Uber’s advertising for
new drivers trumpets the merits of flexibility and “being your own boss.”85 Others
like Lyft and TaskRabbit employ similar characterizations.86 These types of
statements are expressions of how these firms regard themselves, and how they
84. See Francine McKenna, U.K. Ruling on Uber Drivers May Lead SEC to Reexamine Company’s
Revenue Approach, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/uk-rulingon-uber-drivers-may-lead-sec-to-re-examine-companys-revenue-approach-2017-11-20 [https://perma.cc/
BDD7-MVBA].
85. Be Your Own Boss: Drive on the Uber Platform, UBER NEWSROOM (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://newsroom.uber.com/us-louisiana/be-your-own-boss-drive-on-the-uber-platform/ (stating that
“[p]artners who drive on the Uber platform love it because they make higher earnings than traditional
cab drivers and have the flexibility to set their own hours”); Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER,
https://get.uber.com/p/legacy-cl-base/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (“As an independent contractor with
Uber, you’ve got freedom and flexibility to drive whenever you have time.”).
86. Drive More, Earn More, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive-with-lyft [https://perma.cc/RNJ8GGVF] (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (“Be your own boss”; “You choose when you drive”); Why Should I be
a Tasker?, TASKRABBIT, https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411060-Why-should-I-be-aTasker- [https://perma.cc/4MMY-8KUE] (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (“TaskRabbit is a platform that
enables individuals to make a meaningful income by building their own business. Taskers are
independent contractors and manage their accounts according to their preferences . . . . The number one
thing we offer Taskers is flexibility.”).
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intend to describe themselves in litigation. But they also are to some extent used
to convince service providers that they are “gig” workers by emphasizing the
flexibility of gig work. In addition, by framing how the opportunity is advertised
to workers upfront (such as by stating outright that the relationship is one of
independent contractor), these advertising narratives make it harder for workers
to argue on the back end that independent contractor classification is unfair or
wrong.87
Gig talk thus cuts to the heart of the most important legal debates in the new
economy, speaking directly to many of the current legal ambiguities confronting
the new sector.88 A central theme is this: How responsible or involved is the
corporate business itself and how should its relationship to individual workers be
characterized and treated as a matter of law? Gig talk tilts the debate by
underplaying the role of the businesses. The gig narrative suggests that the new
firms ought to be regulated as facilitators of individual enterprise rather than
employers, as apps rather than public accommodations, and as channels of
facilitation rather than objects of regulation.89
Gig talk does not stop at just talk. Gig talk in popular discourse helps support
and give credence to positions the new firms have been taking in actual litigation.
For instance, in court filings concerning litigation over worker classification,
Uber has denied plaintiffs’ attempts to characterize it as a “car service that
provides drivers who can be hailed and dispatched through a mobile phone
application.”90 Instead, it had described itself as “a software technology company
that provides lead generation services for transportation companies and
drivers.”91 Lyft has similarly denied class action plaintiffs’ attempts to
characterize it as a “car service,” admitting only that “Riders and Drivers are
matched with each other using Lyft’s software, and that geographic vicinity is a
87. See supra notes 85 and 86.
88. As noted, these include both the worker classification debates as well as other legal issues. See
supra note 10 and infra notes 89 and 91.
89. See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber All Slapped with $20k Fines by CA Regulator,
ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 14, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/lyft-sidecar-and-uber-allslapped-with-20k-fines-from-ca-regulator/ [https://perma.cc/H8GK-RKUY] (quoting Lyft co-founder as
saying “We are not a charter-party carrier, we are a peer-to-peer carrier” and “I think it’s clear to
everyone that the current framework doesn’t fit modern technology and possibilities.”; quoting Sidecar
CEO as saying “We established SideCar to allow drivers and passengers to connect with one another
under the safe harbor of the ridesharing provisions of the law.”).
90. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C-133826 EMC (N.D. Cal. 2014).
91. Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC (N.D. Cal. 2014). Uber made similar claims in responses to a
wrongful death lawsuit against it. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendants Uber
Technologies, Inc., Raiser LLC, and Raiser-CA LC to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 2–3, Liu v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014) (describing itself as a “technology
company that developed a software application that enables users to request transportation services from
independent, third-party transportation providers”; claiming that “the Uber App provides transportation
providers with a tool to grow their businesses and increase their livelihood” and that drivers use the app
as a “lead generation service”; stating that “Uber itself does not provide transportation services and is
not a transportation carrier.”).
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factor in such matching.”92 Likewise, Grubhub, a company that provides
restaurant food delivery to customers, has characterized itself in litigation
responses as “a technology company that connects restaurants with independent
delivery partners who specialize in delivering food orders from restaurants to
customers at their homes and businesses,” denying plaintiff’s claim that it is a
“food delivery service.”93 All of these positions taken by the new firms are rooted
in the idea that they are merely technology “platforms” that connect
independently operating service providers (drivers) and customers. The
underlying relationship, as described in these litigation responses, is a peer-topeer one between gigging individuals. All of these litigation descriptions seek to
downplay the relationship between the firm and the individuals doing the work.
The ways in which the firms describe themselves outside of litigation—in press
releases and interviews and even in securities filings and financial reporting—
serve to strengthen the credibility of these litigation positions.94
2. How Law Abets Gig Talk
Gig and platform talk has been successful not just because it exists but
because of how such talk relates to current legal ambiguities. The success and
vitality of the gig narrative is in large part due to two features: First, the firms
have had a “first-mover” advantage in taking mandatory legal positions with
respect to their business model virtually from the outset.95 Second, the gig
narrative speaks to material and real ambiguities confronting the new sector. The
new firms are not only able to move swiftly to advance their chosen
characterizations but are also aided by the fact that these characterizations are
credible under the law. Put simply, gig talk is not so outside the realm of legal
possibility that it loses its effect.
First-Mover Advantage. Even as they were advancing “sharing” and
community-based narratives about their activities, the new firms were

92. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint at 3, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-04065-VC (N.D.
Cal. 2015); Answer by Defendant Lyft, Inc., to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint at 3, Cotter v. Lyft,
Inc., No. 3:13-cv-04065-VC (N.D. Cal. 2015).
93. Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Class Action and PAGA Complaint at 2,
Lawson v. Grubhub Holdings Inc., No. 3-15-cv-05128-JSC (N.D. Cal, July 27, 2016). In contrast, plaintiffs
in the California lawsuit characterized Grubhub as “a food delivery service that provides delivery drivers
who can be scheduled and dispatched through a mobile phone application or through its website and who
will deliver food orders from restaurants to customers at their homes and businesses.” Second Amended
Class Action and PAGA Complaint at 3, Lawson v. Grubhub Holdings Inc., No. 3-15-cv-05128-JSC,
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016). On February 22, 2018, a federal district court judge ruled in favor of Grubhub
in the lawsuit, holding that the plaintiff was properly classified as an independent contractor. Lawson v.
Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 2018 WL 776354 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-15386 (9th Cir. Mar.
8, 2018)
94. See supra notes 81–84 (sources discussing Uber’s characterization of itself as an “agent” that
connects drivers who are the “principal” ride providers and the financial reporting positions it has taken
consistent with that characterization).
95. Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 1028–38, 1035 n.222 (discussing how the new businesses have
opportunistically harnessed first-mover advantage); Ring, supra note 28 (describing exercise of firstmover advantage and its effects on policy formulation).
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simultaneously under pressure to take legal positions—for example, tax
positions—with respect to their business transactions. Having to take these real
legal positions has undercut the sharing narrative, but at the same time has helped
firms advance beneficial alternative narratives of their choice. The firms
effectively exercised this first-mover advantage in various ways, most notably in
classifying sector participants as independent contractors for purposes of labor,
tax, and other laws from the outset.96 Uber and Lyft are the most high-profile
examples of firms that embraced independent contractor classification for their
workers. For example, they did not provide overtime, minimum wage, or other
protections, did not acknowledge collective bargaining rights, hired and fired at
will, issued Form 1099s for tax purposes, and did not withhold taxes on amounts
paid to drivers.97 These substantive legal positions were paired with expressive
claims that Uber drivers were working for themselves under flexible (nonemployee) arrangements.98
In being first-movers, these businesses gained the benefit of having a period
of time to operate under the classification of their choice before workers and their
representatives could organize and react. These substantive first-mover choices
helped establish independent contractor classification as the default and endow
it with a presumption of correctness. It allowed courts, sector participants, and
observers to get used to and accept that classification. And it allowed the firms
to grow to a point that causing the business model to collapse became an option
unthinkable to many.
Thus, even though the mandatory nature of tax and other regulatory positiontaking undermined the sharing narrative, that same mandatory-ness also allowed
the firms to take positions consistent with the emerging gig and platform
narratives. However, the firms have faced some pushback. Several lawsuits in
California, Massachusetts, and other states have been filed against Uber and Lyft,
alleging that these businesses misclassified drivers as independent contractors.99
These lawsuits follow in the footsteps of earlier litigation involving the
appropriate classification of FedEx drivers.100 In addition, some administrative
tribunals have held that ride-hailing drivers are properly classified as
employees.101 Despite these pushes in the opposite direction, however, the first96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 85 and 86.
99. See supra note 77 (various court cases alleging misclassification).
100. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling that
the FedEx drivers were employees under California state law, despite the company’s claims that they
were independent contractors); In re Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., Employment Practices Litigation,
Case No. 3:05-MD-527 RLM, 283 F.R.D. 427 (N.D. Indiana 2008).
101. See, e.g., ALJ’s Decision and Order, [Redacted], Case No. 016-23858 (ALJ June 9, 2017) (ALJ
decision holding that three Uber drivers are employees of Uber Technologies, Inc. and eligible for
unemployment benefits); McGillis, No. 0026 2834 68-02 (Dep’t Econ. Opportunity, Sept. 30, 2015) (after
initially finding that driver was employee, Department of Economic Opportunity reversed itself and
found driver was not employee), aff’d McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So.3d 220 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2017) (affirming DEO decision that driver is not employee); Josefa Velasquez, Administrative
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mover advantage enjoyed by the ride-hailing platforms seems to be persisting, as
clearly reflected in the limited progress that has been made through these
lawsuits.
Sufficiently Ambiguous Law. First-mover advantage by itself is not enough.
Another important feature contributing to the staying power and success of the
gig narrative is that gig characterization is actually reasonable under current law.
Take, for example, taxation. As noted, tax returns and information reporting
must be filed annually, and these annual filing and position-taking requirements
undercut the sharing narrative by constructing a commercial counter-narrative.
But that same necessity of taking a tax position—and in particular the necessity
of the firm choosing and issuing the appropriate tax form and doing the
appropriate tax withholding—led to firms choosing to issue 1099s and to perform
information reporting, rather than doing W-2 wage withholding.102 Importantly,
this choice was not obviously wrong and hence became sticky due to
entrenchment and costs of switching.103 Once the firms had taken the initial tax
position (independent contractor treatment), various websites, apps, and
consultants sprang up to advise workers on how to file taxes as independent
contractors.104 The growth of these secondary industries contributed to the
entrenchment of the gig story. In this manner, tax law facilitated the
“independent contractor” narrative and enabled the legal position that workers
were independent contractors.
This dynamic can be observed in other substantive legal and regulatory
decisions as well: the fact that businesses are required to take a position for
commercial, labor, securities, and other legal purposes endows them with a firstmover privilege in selecting what position to take.105 If the positions they embrace
are plausible interpretations of current law, such positions may stick, even if
questionable. Ambiguous and aggressive positions that are still somewhat
credible may provide businesses with the greatest regulatory gains.
3. Procedural and Legal Buttressing
An important factor contributing to the success of gig framing and related
legal position taking stems from the fact that the businesses have been able to
shore up these choices using procedural legal tools and strategies that make it
hard for others to contest these positions going forward. Law and the legal
process have been effectively harnessed to ensure that the competing

Law Judge Says Uber Drivers are Employees, Not Contractors, N.Y. L.J. (June 14, 2017), http://www.new
yorklawjournal.com/id=1202789899357/Administrative-Law-Judge-Says-Uber-Drivers-Are-EmployeesNot-Contractors?mcode=1202615704879&slreturn=20170909100329 [https://perma.cc/E9YL-6N7D].
102. Oei & Ring, supra note 7.
103. Once workers received Form 1099, they had to file Schedules C and E and compute expenses.
See IRS, SCHEDULE C (FORM 1040) (2017); IRS, SCHEDULE E (FORM 1040) (2017).
104. Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 6 & n.13 (discussing third-party tax assistance services); Oei & Ring,
supra note 38, at 59 (analyzing tax-related discussions on three separate internet forums).
105. See, e.g., supra notes 81–84 (discussing Uber’s preferred financial reporting position for
securities law purposes.)
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characterizations and narratives do not take off.
One key example is the steps Uber has taken to gain an advantage in worker
classification fights. Most materially, Uber has created a default by which drivers
enter into arbitration agreements, waiving their rights to pursue class action
challenges.106 This has proven an effective strategy in stalling class action suits
that claim that drivers have been improperly classified as independent
contractors, forcing drivers to resort to piecemeal arbitrations, which are unlikely
to fundamentally transform the worker classification landscape.
In particular, in the California class action lawsuit against Uber, the fact that
most drivers had agreed to binding arbitration at the outset has acted as a bar to
class-based litigations. On September 7, 2016, the Ninth Circuit struck a blow to
the California class action, holding that the clauses delegating authority to
arbitration tribunals were enforceable.107 On November 21, 2016, the district
court stayed five related litigations as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.108
Thus, Uber’s first-mover decision to classify drivers as independent contractors,
buttressed by the arbitration clauses in the driver agreements, has served as an
effective brake on attempts to contest that initial classification. While the
California Lyft lawsuit settled for $27 million in March 2017, that amount is not
hugely significant and does not settle the worker classification question going
forward.109
In the face of these obstacles to the class action approach, some states and
localities have explored providing more piecemeal protections for TNC drivers
that may be effective short of total reclassification. Most notably, Seattle issued
an ordinance establishing a process for drivers to collectively negotiate with ridehailing companies, with the goal of strengthening worker protections, conditions,
and safety bargaining rights.110 But firm-side interests have attempted to harness
antitrust arguments to defeat such measures. For example, the United States
Chamber of Commerce sued Seattle, alleging antitrust violations and preemption
by the NLRA.111 The argument was that collective negotiation among drivers
constitutes anticompetitive collusion between businesses (that is, gig workers
106. Elizabeth Chika Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, Misclassification in the Sharing Economy: It’s the
Arbitration Agreements, 70 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (analyzing use of class action waivers
by sharing economy companies).
107. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016), superseded by 848 F.3d 1201
(9th Cir. 2016); see also Lamour v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2017 WL 878712 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1,
2017) (recommending that case be stayed pending arbitrator’s resolution of individual plaintiff’s claim,
and grant Uber’s motion to strike plaintiff’s collective action allegations).
108. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and Related Cases, No. 13-cv-038126-EMC, Order Re
Stays (Nov. 21, 2016).
109. Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, Cotter v. Lyft, No. 13-cv-04065-VC
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2017). In April 2018, a district court judge ruled that drivers for Uber’s limousine
service (UberBLACK) are not Uber’s employees. Memorandum and Order Granting Uber’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 16-573 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018). The plaintiffs
in that case were drivers who had not agreed to binding arbitration. Id.
110. City of Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124968 (Dec. 23, 2015).
111. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Seattle, No. 2:17-cv-00370-RSL, 2017 WL
5197158 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 6, 2017).
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operating as “microbusinesses”).112 The antitrust argument has met some
resistance: On August 1, 2017, the Washington District Court dismissed the
Chamber of Commerce’s antitrust argument, concluding that the Ordinance did
not violate the Sherman Act or the state’s antitrust law.113 But the Ninth Circuit
subsequently enjoined the Seattle ordinance pending its own resolution of the
case.114 The deployment of antitrust and preemption arguments are an instance
of throwing up legal roadblocks to buttress the underlying substantive claim.
The battle to shore up gig treatment has also been waged by proposals to
change the law. Take tax law, for example: Legislation has been proposed in both
the U.S. Senate and the House that purports to “clarify” the independent
contractor status of gig workers for tax purposes.115 Among other items, this
legislation provides a safe harbor that, if met, will guarantee the treatment of gig
workers as independent contractors. The safe harbor specifies three objective
tests that must be satisfied in order to receive such treatment.116 Generally, the
three tests focus on (1) the relationship between the parties (including how the
service provider incurs expenses, the specificity of the task agreed to be
performed, and other factors such as exclusivity and extent of investment in assets
or training), (2) the location of services or means by which the services are
provided (generally, service providers must either provide their own equipment,
perform services in their own place of business rather than service recipients’, or
pay fair rental value for use of service recipient’s place of business), and (3) the
existence of a written contract specifying the independent-contractor
relationship, acknowledging responsibility for taxes, and agreeing to a tax
reporting/withholding obligation.117 The first two tests are not difficult to meet.
The third is essentially met if there is a written contract in which the parties
acknowledge and agree to independent contractor treatment.118

112. The Washington District Court issued an injunction, putting the ordinance on hold until such
legal issues have been resolved. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Seattle, No. 2:17-cv-00370RSL, 2017 WL 1233181(W.D. Wash., Apr. 4, 2017); Greg Bensinger, Federal Judge Puts Hold on Seattle
Ordinance Allowing Uber, Lyft Union Vote, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
federal-judge-puts-hold-on-seattle-ordinance-allowing-uber-lyft-union-vote-1491336939; Denton, supra
note 78.
113. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Seattle, No. 2:17-cv-00370-RSL, 2017 WL
3267730 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2017).
114. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Seattle, No. 17-35640 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2017);
Linda Chiem, States, AFL-CIO Back Seattle’s Uber Union Law in 9th Circuit, LAW 360 (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/993382 [https://perma.cc/9PB7-C9DX].
115. New Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and Growth Act of 2017, H.R. 4165, 115th
Cong. (2017) (“NEW GIG Act of 2017”); S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017) (same).
116. See supra note 115. For further discussion, see Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Senate Tax
Bill and the Battles over Worker Classification, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2017), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof_blog/2017/11/the-senate-tax-bill-and-worker-classification.html
[https://perma.cc/9SPYL76Y]; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Will Proposed Tax Legislation Tilt the Worker Classification
Debate?, ON LABOR BLOG (Nov. 16, 2017), https://onlabor.org/will-proposed-tax-legislation-tilt-theworker-classification-debate/ [https://perma.cc/3MBA-RMC4].
117. See supra note 115 and 116.
118. Id.
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The legislation is justified by its sponsor as providing “clear rules” and “peace
of mind” for workers.119 However, that narrow justification is disingenuous
because the proposed legislation, if passed, is likely to have an impact on the
broader underlying debate regarding worker classification, with all of its labor
law and other implications. By “clarifying” that independent contractor
treatment is the right one for tax purposes, the legislation would entrench such
treatment, and would therefore substantively tip the balance of the entire debate
towards independent contractor status, thereby supporting the “gig” vision of this
sector. Ten prominent firms operating on the so-called “platform” model—
including Uber, Instacart, Postmates, and Grubhub—have indicated their
support of this legislation in writing.120
This proposed legislation found its way into the initial November 9, 2017
Description of the Chairman’s Mark prepared by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, which contained in substance the Senate version of the then-proposed
2017 tax reform legislation scheduled for legislative markup.121 The independent
contractor safe harbor was stricken from the revised Description of the
Chairman’s Mark released on November 14, 2017 and did not become law as part
of the 2017 tax changes; however, its inclusion in the November 9 Chairman’s
Mark description provides some indication of the seriousness with which this
legislation was pushed in recent tax reform initiatives.122 In particular, various
lobbyists and supporters of the new firms wrote opinion pieces online in support
of this proposed legislation, and it is quite possible that such legislation might be
re-introduced in the future.123 This proposed tax legislation is an example of an
attempt to actively lobby for laws that cement the classification of workers as
independent contractors, thereby buttressing the preferred gig characterization
and business model.
In addition to clear and direct attempts at “clarifying” independent contractor
classification for tax purposes, there have also been more pervasive and

119. See Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator John Thune, Thune Introduces Bill to Add Certainty
to Worker Classification Rules (July 13, 2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/
thune-introduces-bill-to-add-certainty-to-worker-classification-rules [https://perma.cc/C45J-7ZUU].
120. See Letter re: Support for S. 1549, The New Economy Work to Guarantee Independence and
Growth Act of 2017 (“NEW GIG ACT of 2017”) (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/
_cache/files/188c3824-417e-48b5-9239-6af4b5dff1c6/78A9306A1CA70CFC597175E47D8189EF.thunenew-gig.pdf [https://perma.cc/59CQ-2GWY]; see also Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator John Thune,
Ten Innovative Technology Companies Support Thune’s NEW GIG Act (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/8/ten-innovative-technology-companies-supportthune-s-new-gig-act [https://perma.cc/Z62J-YHQT].
121. See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-17, 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK
OF THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Comm. Print Nov. 9, 2017).
122. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONGRESS, DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S
MODIFICATION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Comm. Print 2017).
123. See, e.g., Althea Erickson, Gig Economy Too Important to be Left Out of Tax Reform Plans,
HILL (Nov. 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/358091-critical-gig-economy-left-out-of-tax-refo
rm-debate [https://perma.cc/9BQY-H69Q]; Bradley Tusk, Uber Drivers are “Independent Contractors.”
Here’s How Tax Reform Can Settle the Issue, CNBC (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/10/
tax-reform-must-address-uber-lyft-and-gig-economy-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/ VT9P-HJ9S].
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successful initiatives to alter economic incentives and to buttress independent
contractor classification for tax purposes. The passthrough provisions of the
recently passed tax legislation provide a new deduction for taxpayers who
organize themselves as so-called passthrough entities (such as partnerships, S
corporations, and solo proprietors).124 Various commentators have noted that
this favorable treatment of taxpayers operating as passthrough businesses creates
an incentive for certain taxpayers to reorganize as passthroughs and classify
themselves as independent contractors (or be less resistant to the decisions of
firms to classify them as such) in order to obtain the tax benefits, thereby
potentially foregoing direct employee protections.125 The passthrough provisions
of the new tax bill are not limited to workers in the sharing/gig sector, nor is it
clear that reorganizing as a passthrough entity and embracing independent
contractor classification will be a sensible calculus for those doing work on
platforms, particularly those who earn low amounts. But the enactment of the
new passthrough provisions in the tax bill suggest that the battle to move towards
a “gig” or independent contractor-based economy is being waged broadly by a
variety of interests, and these broader attempts to change the law will have an
impact on those working in the platform sector.
Finally, legislative and academic proposals for the creation of a third category
of workers between independent contractors and employees or for special
regimes or benefits for gig workers, may similarly tip the scales in favor of gig
characterization and its regulatory consequences.126 The general principle is that

124. H.R. 1, 115th Cong., § 11011 (2017) (enacting new I.R.C. § 199A, effective for tax years ending
after December 31, 2017).
125. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Tax Plans May Give Your Co-Worker a Better Deal Than You, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/business/economy/tax-plans-may-give-yourco-worker-a-better-deal-than-you.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/J7VC-LWXU]; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M.
Ring, Work-Related Distortions in the Tax Reform Bills: Understanding the New Proposed Provisions
(Part 1 of 2), ON LABOR BLOG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://onlabor.org/work-related-distortions-in-the-taxreform-bills-understanding-the-new-proposed-provisions-part-1-of-2/ [https://perma.cc/LU72-DEVZ];
Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Work-Related Distortions in the Tax Reform Bills: Understanding the New
Proposed Provisions (PART 2 OF 2), ON LABOR BLOG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://onlabor.org/work-relateddistortions-in-the-proposed-tax-bills-understanding-the-policy-conversations-part-2-of-2/
[https://perma.cc/EMH7-75NX]; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on
the Conference Committee Tax Bill (Dec. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089423 [https://perma.cc/H57Z-RTX5]; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Is
New Code Section 199A Really Going to Turn Us All Into Independent Contractors? (Jan. 12, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101180 [https://perma.
cc/8JWZ-MLKJ].
126. See, e.g., SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” (2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_kr
ueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNX6-Q2MD] (proposing a new category of “independent worker”
that provides some of the protections employees receive, but not all); Marc Linder, Towards Universal
Worker Coverage under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees,
Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DETROIT L. REV. 555 599–601 (1989)
(proposing a new category of employee modeled after third category used in other countries); Thomas,
supra note 2 (proposing “non-employee withholding” and “standard business deduction” tax regimes for
gig workers); see also Lauren Weber, What if There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent Contractor,
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if the burdens faced by those who would otherwise be treated as independent
contractors were to be alleviated, or if an intermediate classification were
obtainable, this may tend to undercut arguments in favor of employee protections
and reduce the risk of such classification being required of firms.127
IV
THE ROAD FORWARD: PROSPECTS FOR OTHER TYPES OF TALK?
It is impossible to prove that the deployment of gig characterization is the
only reason certain legal treatments and outcomes, including independent
contractor classification for workers, seem to be sticking, at least for the time
being. But it is plausible that while gig and related characterizations appear
innocuous and accurate relative to the sharing characterization, this set of
descriptors may actually be doing more work than the sharing characterization in
terms of advancing a desired regulatory outcome. The reasons they are able to
do more work are that (1) gig characterization speaks to an important and
material legal ambiguity; (2) gig characterization is plausibly accurate, even if
deeply contested; and (3) the proponents of gig characterization have been able
to use procedural and other tools to shore up gig characterization and defeat its
competitors. These observations may be generalized beyond the gig context:
While the temptation is to focus on narratives and characterizations that are
clearly wrong, this essay suggests that we should also pay attention to more subtle
narratives that are less clearly wrong, because these narratives may actually be
doing more work by virtue of being “almost right.”
This essay does not argue that gig characterization is necessarily the wrong
one, or even the less normatively desirable one at the end of the day. There may
be good reasons why businesses and some workers may prefer independent
contractor treatment to employee classification (for example, fears that the job
opportunities will diminish as operating costs and protections rise). Rather, this
essay’s goal is to highlight how the businesses have harnessed seemingly
innocuous descriptions to reap large regulatory gains, and also to point out how
journalists, academics, and other commentators may, in the pursuit of greater
accuracy, have unwittingly helped the businesses bolster and disseminate gig- and
platform-favorable narratives.
Is there any hope for counter narratives to gig talk? Gig characterization is
sticky but not immutable. Despite the power of the gig narrative, it is conceivable
that under some circumstances, it might lose its potency or prove less attractive.
While predicting the full narrative trajectory of the new sector is beyond the
scope of this essay, a couple of preliminary observations can be made. First, the
continuing vitality of the gig narrative will depend on how competing narrative
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-workerdependent-contractor-1422405831.
127. See Miriam Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 639, 655–67 (2017) (discussing risks of creating third
category—such as risk of arbitrage between categories—based on experiences of other countries).
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options perform. One potential counter narrative is an “employment” narrative
that emphasizes more strongly the role played by firms. Such a narrative might,
for example, highlight that those providing services in the sector generally do not
capture the upside of their work and are under the direct or indirect control and
direction of the firms. Another possible narrative may be one of “fragility” or
“contingency”: Rather than highlight the entrepreneurial nature of the work, one
might emphasize its contingent or insecure nature, which suggests the need for
worker protections. A third possibility is that as more traditional businesses (such
as taxicabs) also harness technology and become similar to the new firms, the line
between the new firms and tech-savvy incumbents (and with it, the power of gig
talk) may dissolve. On the flip side, it is also possible that such convergence
between industries will allow gig characterization and its legal implications to
permeate industries beyond what is currently understood as the gig sector. Up to
this point, none of the competitor narratives have performed strongly enough to
pose a real threat to gig talk. However, this may change in the future.
Second, whether gig talk will win out over competing narratives will depend
on underlying economic and regulatory conditions. It is possible that adverse
regulatory shocks may spur different ways of talking about the new sector. For
example, immediately after the announcement that Uber was to lose its London
license, several of the company’s defenders were quick to point out that this
would lead to tens of thousands of workers losing their jobs.128 This is an example
of a regulatory shock suddenly making the “worker protection” and
“employment” narrative more compelling from a business perspective. It is also
possible that as economic conditions in a country improve and other types of
employment opportunities arise drawing potential new economy workers away
from the sector, it may prove advantageous to recast gig opportunities as
comparable to more secure traditional employment opportunities or to change
the structure of gig work to offer more robust benefits and protections. This is
another type of shock that might create a shift away from gig characterization.
Third, the continuing prevalence and vitality of gig talk will depend on how
technology continues to advance and develop. For example, if gig firms are able
to eventually replace human labor with robots and self-driving cars, this may
eliminate the need for gig talk as a regulatory strategy altogether. There is some
suggestion that firms may be moving in the direction of replacing the human
workforce. For example, Uber recently ordered 24,000 self-driving SUVs from
Volvo.129 More broadly, scholars and commentators are speculating over whether

128. See, e.g., Robert Booth, Uber Drivers in London Warn of Financial Ruin for Thousands of
Families, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/22/uberdrivers-london-warn-financial-ruin-thousands-families [https://perma.cc/TJ4G-WZZW].
129. William Boston, Volvo Promises Uber Fleet of Self-Driving Taxis by 2019, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/volvo-promises-uber-fleet-of-self-driving-taxis-by-2019-1511184730.
However, in the aftermath of an accident in Arizona in March 2017 in which an Uber self-driving car
killed a pedestrian, Uber’s self-driving car testing program was suspended in Arizona. Daisuke
Wakabayashi, Uber Ordered to Take Its Self-Driving Cars Off Arizona Roads, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/technology/arizona-uber-cars.html [https://perma.cc/5C58-
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automation will lead to declining work opportunities for humans and arguing
over how to address these threats to human labor.130 If technology does replace
human labor, the emphasis on gig characterization may decline, because
traditional concerns about how humans are subject to tax and labor law might
become less salient.
Whether or not gig talk persists or is displaced by competitor narratives, the
insights offered in this essay remain relevant: From the point of view of legal and
regulatory fights, it may not necessarily be the most obviously wrong descriptions
that are doing the regulatory work but the ones most able to subtly corral law in
support of underlying regulatory goals. Academic, journalists, and policymakers
should take note.

KKM4]. Uber also voluntarily suspended testing in all U.S. cities after the crash. Faiz Siddiqui, Tech
Firms, Government Officials Put the Brakes on Testing Self-Driving Vehicles After Fatal Uber Crash,
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/03/27/arizonagovernor-suspends-testing-of-ubers-self-driving-cars-i-was-very-disturbed-by-video-of-fatalcrash/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cbfbc66126f5 [https://perma.cc/4CFM-HKCU]. These developments
suggest that Uber’s self-driving car program may have hit roadblocks.
130. See, e.g., Michael Jones, Yes, The Robots Will Steal Our Jobs. And That’s Fine, WASH. POST
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/17/yes-the-robots-willsteal-our-jobs-and-thats-fine/?utm_term=.13b33ece8770 [https://perma.cc/82ZS-3MK9]; Carl Benedikt
Frey & Michael Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation
(Oxford Martin Sch., Working Paper 2013), https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/
The_Future_of_Employment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FBC-5CYT].

